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Abstract. In this paper the major objective is to design and analyze the suitability of Gaussian similarity measure for intrusion 
detection. The objective is to use this as a distance measure to find the distance between any two data samples of training set such 
as DARPA Data Set, KDD Data Set.  This major objective is to use this measure as a distance metric when applying k- means 
algorithm.  The novelty of this approach is making use of the proposed distance function as part of k-means algorithm so as to 
obtain disjoint clusters. This is followed by a case study, which demonstrates the process of Intrusion Detection. The proposed 
similarity has fixed upper and lower bounds.  The proposed similarity measure satisfies all properties of a typical similarity 
measure. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Intrusion Detection is the process of acquiring or an unauthorized attempt, to acquire the rights over 
computing resources or information resources. Nowadays Intrusion Detection is becoming an alarming problem. 
Research in this area is started many years back and there were significant improvements in the intrusion detection 
process. The attacks and threats are also changing their orientation while this aggression. 
Several Intrusion Detection Systems are in use which are working on different approaches   such   as   Signature   
based (Neminath,   2014),   anomaly   based,   SVM Based (Thorsten, 1999), Text Processing, Genetic algorithm 
based, Fuzzy Logic based (Mohammad, 2011) and Association Rule based approaches.   Apart from all these 
approaches if the intrusion detection mechanisms are to be devised in two broad categories, they are signature based 
and anomaly based techniques (James, 2006)(Lee, 1999). 
Signature based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is generally works based on analyzing the packets, packet 
sequences, traffic analysis. The IDS will search into the packet for some sequence or pattern which we call as a 
signature known to be malicious (Sang, 2003).  The Signature based detection approach gives fruitful results only 
for the known attacks. The advantage of these approaches is the identifying a signature for a threat and loading its 
pattern into the database is quite simple (Yuxin, 2013). Once these signatures were loaded into the database, the IDS 
will check each packet and compare whether the signature pattern is present in the packet or not in the packet or bit 
sequence.   The Signature matching engines do have their own disadvantages as they detect only known attacks. 
This approach is not suitable for those attacks which were not present in the Signature database.  The rate of getting 
false alarms in this case is huge in size. The reason for getting false alarms very frequently is that generally a 
signature consists of regular expressions, string patterns. While the signature based detection shows an excellent 
performance in the case of threats consisting of fixed behaviour patterns. Whereas, it is almost impossible to detect 
unknown and threats that do frequently changes behavior as in attacks generated through intelligent softwares such 
as worms, Trojans, etc., as they have self- modifying behavioral characteristics. A Signature based IDS introducing 
the arms race between the IDS Signature developers and attackers. The performance of the signature based IDS is 
greatly influenced by the size of the signature data base as it has accelerated growth in volume.  Even Small 
variation in the signature, causing a new entry in a signature database (Chirag, 2013)(Govindarajan, 2011). 
The anomaly based Intrusion Detection System basically works on the principle of creating boundaries which 
specifies accepted behavior and unaccepted behavior. Any incoming event  or  outgoing event  which  falls  in  the  
range  of  unaccepted behavior in an anomaly detection engine declares it as a threat.  The important point while 
designing the anomaly detection engine is that the engine must be given power to get into deep of each of the 
protocols that need to be monitored by the engine. Of course this is a very expensive job as dissection of the 
protocols in the initial stage is complex. The biggest challenge of the anomaly based IDS, is to understand, design, 
test and implement the rules for each protocol. On the other hand, if the rules are formed, the anomaly based IDS 
performs threat a detection job can be scaled more quickly and easily than the signature based IDS. The major pitfall 
of anomaly based IDS is that any anomaly within the range of the normal usage patterns is undetected. However, the 
anomaly based IDS is far better than the signature based IDS as any new threat not having the signature will be 
detected as its behavior is out of the normal behavior pattern (Alok, 2007). 
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In this paper, we use a novel similarity measure to form the normal behavior over the system calls caused by the 
processes. 
2. VARIOUS KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY BASED APPROACHES FOR INTRUSION DETECTION 
Since intrusion detection mechanisms are imperfect, continuous surveillance of security compromises is 
becoming mandatory.  This role will be taken care with the intrusion detection system (IDS), which aims at raising 
alarms whenever malicious activity is detected.  Intrusion detection systems can be of two types, the host based 
intrusion detection system (HIDS) and the network based intrusion detection system (NIDS).  The purpose of IDS is 
to continuously, monitor the incoming requests and correlate with the existing knowledge base and an alarm is 
raised if the anomaly is detected considering it as a threat.  Unfortunately, so far, no intrusion detection system is 
proved to be perfect in this detection process.  Many algorithms with different approaches were proposed in the 
literature, but none of them is proved to be ideal approach.  Each new approach that is getting published is 
demonstrating, an improvement over the existing system only (Davis, 2011).   
The intrusion detection systems (IDSs) can also be categorized based on the misuse and anomaly based.  The 
misuse based intrusion detection systems generally rely upon the rules framed by domain experts.  These rules play 
an important role in making the decision where the incoming request is actually a threat or not.  The performance of 
the detection process is relying on the rules that were framed.  All commercial software such as anti-virus software 
uses misuse based approach and generates very less number of false alarms.  As the number of threats or malwares 
increases, then there is a direct influence over the correlation of the rules with knowledge base resulting lower 
performance. In this case the job of continuous analysis and update process is a laborious job. Adding fuel to fire, 
now a days is becoming a challenging that many tools are available, making the attacker‘s job easy, to create new 
threats or attacks. One of the drawbacks of the misuse based detection process is that these systems cannot detect the 
zero day or novel attacks.   
The other approach is anomaly based approach, which was proposed to deal with novel attacks.  This approach 
works based on the behavior of the processes.  If the behavior of the process is deviating from the pre-determined 
model that is developed for the detection process, it raises an alarm.  Unfortunately, anomaly based intrusion 
detection systems generate false positives that were triggered by novel but genuine traffic.  This issue in anomaly 
based intrusion detection systems results in exhibition of poor performance.  Even 1% of the false positives leads to 
severe impact over the performance of the IDS.  Another problem with anomaly based intrusion detection is that it is 
also generating too much of false negatives.  Anomaly based approach is one of the prominent research area, 
because of this reason (Davis, 2011).   
The intrusion detection systems (IDSs), scans the traffic passively.  There are intrusion prevention systems (IPS), 
which works in line with traffic, thus prevents the malicious traffic from entering the network.  These techniques 
prevent malicious traffic before they enter the organization network avoiding severe damage to the computing 
resources. 
 
3.  PROPOSED APPROACH 
In this current work, we have two objectives. To design the distance measure with tight bounds. For this we use 
the basic Gaussian function to obtain the proposed distance metric designed. The designed distance measure may 
also be used as metric to compute the similarity between two processes. There is a tight bound on the distance values 
computed using our current measure. In short, we have a minimum value and a maximum value of zero (0) and 
unity (1) respectively. In the earlier work, we adopted the distance metric on binary representation of process 
system-call representation (Gunupudi, 2015). In this paper, we adopt the frequency representation of the process-
system call matrix. The objective is to show the proposed measure holds good for both binary and frequency 
representations with tight bounds on minimum and maximum possible distance values. We also discuss the space 
complexity if input representation is considered directly without dimensionality reduction. The space efficiency 
achieved is discussed in the section-5. Another objective is to use this distance measure as part of clustering 
algorithm and then perform classification and predict intrusion. Sometimes, the clustering process may not converge 
and diverges repeatedly. In such a case, it is better to stop the iterations after performing for predefined number of 
iterations and use these clusters to achieve required objective. A point to be remembered and noted here is that the 
accuracy of clustering is not the criteria for the required objective to be achieved. We are performing clustering only 
for the reason of achieving dimensionality reduction. To achieve dimensionality reduction, we choose to obtain 
number of clusters equal to a total count of the decision classes of dataset. However, obtaining clusters equal to a 
number of decision classes is also a relaxed constraint. The main objective is to obtain the distance of each process 
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to cluster centers of clusters generated and add this distances to the nearest neighbor distance computed as discussed 
in sections below. In this way, we transform high dimensional process into low dimensional process.  
 
3.1 Dimensionality Reduction of Training Set for Intrusion Detection 
In this current work, we adopt the framework of the authors (Wei-Chao, 2015) for dimensionality reduction. For 
achieving dimensionality reduction, we cluster the process into the desired number of clusters say ‗K‘. This ‗K‘ is 
usually the number of decision class labels of the input dataset. However, we can obtain any number of desired 
clusters, K < P where P is assumed to be the total number of processes being considered in dataset. To perform 
process of clustering, we adopt the designed Gaussian based distance measure to cluster processes, find the distance 
between each process and cluster centers of clusters generated and also to compute the nearest neighbor distances of 
intra processes. The novelty of our approach starts with the usage of distance measure designed.  
In the present approach dimensionality reduction is achieved by clustering training set processes adopting the 
proposed measure. Here, we consider obtaining clusters from training set by setting the bound of number of clusters 
as a number of decision classes. However, in practice, we may obtain any number of clusters. In our case, the 
number of clusters is a relaxed constraint. We aim clustering of processes only for achieving reduced process 
dimensionality. In the discussions below, we use clustering method K-means with the proposed distance measure. 
The clustering achieved is static as it requires the entire processes to be specified well ahead before clustering. 
However, even for dynamically varying and incoming processes, we may perform clustering using proposed 
distance measure. This is because of the flexibility of the framework of Gaussian function adopted. Processed 
Intrusion datasets have labeled attacks, because of which we have flexibility to decide on the bound of clusters. If 
the bound is known before clustering, obviously better choice is k-Means (Wenke, 1998). In our discussions below, 
we have used k=2 and it is not a compulsion. We may choose a different value of k as clustering accuracy is not our 
objective here.  
 
3.2 Distance Measure of K-Means 
K-means traditionally uses distance measures such as the Euclidean, city block, and cosine etc. We choose to use 
a Gaussian based distance function to obtain the clusters using framework of k-means procedure. The measure 
designed has tighter bounds and may be used for computing process similarity or distances.  
 
3.3 Gaussian Function 
We consider the Gaussian function based distance measure to find the similarity between the data samples of the 
intrusion dataset. We use the same distance measure and apply k-Means algorithm to cluster the data samples. For 
the purpose of dimensionality reduction, we use the k-Means clustering technique to obtain clusters using the 
proposed distance function and then, to find the distance between each training data sample and each of the cluster 
centroids. This is further followed by finding the nearest neighbor for every data sample within the cluster. These 
two distances are summed to get a new distance value. This distance value becomes a singleton feature for each 
training data sample. Thus each data sample of the training set is mapped to a single feature value reducing the 
dimensionality to 1. 
The Proposed distance function is defined as given in Equation. 5.  We consider the Gaussian function based 
distance measure to find the similarity between processes of the intrusion dataset.    We use the same distance 
measure and apply the k-Means algorithm to cluster the processes.   For the purpose of dimensionality reduction, we 
use the k-Means clustering technique to obtain clusters using the proposed distance function and then find the 
distance between each training data sample and each of the cluster centroids. This is further followed by finding the 
nearest neighbor for every data sample within the cluster. These two distances are summed to get a new distance 
value. This distance value becomes a singleton feature for each training data sample. Thus each data sample of the 
training set is mapped to a single feature value reducing the dimensionality to 1.  
The Proposed distance function is defined as given in Equation. 1 
 
𝑮 𝒙,𝝁,𝝈 =  𝒆
− 𝒙−𝝁𝝈  
𝟐
;   𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉  𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒔  𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕
𝟎            ;   𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒔  𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕
  
(1) 
Where 
 
x = system call being considered  
μ = mean of the system call w.r.t data samples present in the cluster 
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σ= standard deviation of the system call considered w.r.t data samples of the training set.  
 
The denominator of IDSIM is given by Equation.2 as shown below 
 
𝑯 𝒙,𝝁,𝝈 =  
  𝟏               ;   𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒓 𝒃𝒐𝒕𝒉  𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒔  𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕
𝟎                 ;𝒏𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒔𝒚𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒎 𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒔  𝒆𝒙𝒊𝒔𝒕
  
(2) 
 
The average distance is the ratio of 𝑮 𝒙,𝝁,𝝈  and 𝑯 𝒙,𝝁,𝝈  and is represented as given by Equation 3. 
𝑮 𝒙,𝝁,𝝈 
𝑯 𝒙,𝝁,𝝈 
 
(3) 
 
 
Figure 1: (a) Dimensionality Reduction of Testing Set   (b) Dimensionality Reduction of Training Test 
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The average distance considering the distribution of all features hence is defined as the ration of 𝑮 𝒙,𝝁,𝝈  and 
𝑯 𝒙,𝝁,𝝈  which is reduced to Equation.4 as given below 
𝑭𝒂𝒗𝒈 =  
   𝒆
−(
𝒙𝒊𝒔− 𝝁𝒊𝒔
𝝈𝒔
)𝟐𝒔=𝒎
𝒔=𝟏
𝒊=𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 𝟏𝒔=𝒎𝒔=𝟏
 
(4) 
The distance function is represented as given by 
𝑰𝑫𝑺𝑰𝑴 =  
𝟏 +  𝑭𝒂𝒗𝒈
𝟐
 
(5) 
Where i indicates the ith data sample. S indicates the system call. IDSIM indicates the similarity function. 
 
𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒕 = 𝟏 − 𝑰𝑫𝑺𝑰𝑴 
(6) 
 
3.4 Dimensionality Reduction of Training Set for Intrusion Detection 
Figure.1 (a) shows the proposed approach for reducing the dimensionality of the training   set   and   Figure.1 (b)   
shows   the   proposed   approach   for   reducing   the dimensionality of the testing set using the proposed measure 
with k-Means clustering technique. So, we have both the testing and training sets with each data sample transformed 
to a singleton feature value. The test dataset can now be compared with training dataset in a very simple and 
effective, efficient way. The Proposed approach concentrates on using the Gaussian function based distance along 
with the k-Means instead of conventional distance function used by k-Means algorithm. 
 
3.4 Experiments with DARPA dataset 
The widely used dataset for host based intrusion detection is DARPA 98 BSM (Basic Security Module) data.  The 
other reason for choosing DARPA is that the works by (Rawat, 2006) (Alok, 2007) were done on the DARPA 98 
BSM data.  Hence we prefer to choose the same dataset for our experimentation. As shown in figure 1 the DARPA 
dataset have 60 unique system calls and on removing 10 system calls having similar operation with small changes in 
prefixes and suffixes, we have obtained 50 unique system calls.  Figure2 shows the list of 50final unique systems 
calls considered by (Rawat, 2006) (Alok, 2007), that present in training, test, and attack processes data. Hence these 
50 system calls were taken into consideration for our experimentation. 
 
4. CASE STUDY 
The processed form of DARPA Dataset (Rawat, 2006)is divided into three components, the train data, test data 
and attack data.  The train data is consisting of 606 processes in it and all of them are normal processes.  The test 
data comprises of 5285 normal processes enables us to test our approach.  The attack data comprises of 55 attacks, 
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each attack is having several processes in which at least one or more processes are abnormal processes.  We 
consider only 54 attacks as one attack is exactly matching the train data. 
In order to proceed for the demonstration of the proposed similarity measure, we have selected 4 normal processes 
randomly from the training dataset and 6 abnormal processes from the attack data from which only one process 
found in respective attack.  It is already known that, the attack data will contain at least one or more abnormal 
processes; hence we select those processes which is the only process present in the attack data. 
As this is only demonstration we have selected 10 system calls from the 50 system calls that present in each 
process.  The selected 10 system calls are shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 Unique System calls data in DARPA 98 BSM dataset 
List of 10 System Calls 
fchdir     login   pipe    logout   munmap   sysinfo audition   
chdir  pathdonf   boom 
 
The table.4 shows the process system call matrix and the corresponding class label for each process. The last 
column of table.4 corresponds to the class label. Here, we have two classes called normal and abnormal (Wei-Chao, 
2015) (Yihua, 2002)(Rawat, 2006). 
So, we choose to cluster these records in to two clusters, cluster-0 and cluster-1. For this, we use k-Means 
clustering algorithm as we can specify the number of clusters required by specifying the value of k=2. 
But, the difference lies in the distance measure used. Here, we use the Gaussian based similarity measure for 
clustering using k-Means as against to traditional distance measures used such as Euclidean, Cosine, City block. 
At the end of the clustering process, we have two clusters as shown in Table.5 We perform 3 iterations using k-
Means by recording the clusters at each iteration. We terminate the process of clustering, when the clusters formed 
for two successive stages remain same. This process is shown for each iteration using the Table. 4, through Table.9 
Table.13 shows the nearest neighbors for each process within the same cluster and also the similarity w.r.t clusters 
formed.  Table.14 and table.15 shows the nearest neighbor for each process in cluster-1 and cluster-2 respectively. 
Table 4 Process system call matrix 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Class 
P0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 Normal 
P1 0 0 1 1 1 6 0 0 0 0 Normal 
P2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 Normal 
P3 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 Normal 
P4 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Abnormal 
P5 2 2 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 Abnormal 
P6 2 2 4 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 Abnormal 
P7 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 Abnormal 
P8 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 Abnormal 
P9 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 Abnormal 
Table 5 Initial Clusters 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 Class 
P0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 Normal 
P1 0 0 1 1 1 6 0 0 0 0 Normal 
Table 6 Similarity of Process with Initial Clusters 
 Cluster1 Cluster2 Class 
P0 1.0000 0.6307 0 
P1 0.6307 1.0000 1 
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P2 0.6494 0.7523 1 
P3 0.5780 0.6273 1 
P4 0.7195 0.5767 0 
P5 0.6564 0.6697 1 
P6 0.6546 0.6131 0 
P7 0.6718 0.6284 0 
P8 0.6718 0.6284 0 
P9 0.9299 0.6307 0 
Table 6 Clusters 
 Processes 
Cluster1 [0, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Cluster2 [1, 2, 3, 5] 
Table 7 Similarity of Process with Initial Clusters 
 Cluster1 Cluster2 Class 
P0 0.7200 0.7129 0 
P1 0.6966 0.7525 1 
P2 0.7093 0.7525 1 
P3 0.6593 0.7467 1 
P4 0.7672 0.6402 0 
P5 0.8408 0.5994 0 
P6 0.7904 0.5731 0 
P7 0.8172 0.6164 0 
P8 0.8172 0.6164 0 
P9 0.7616 0.6945 0 
Table 8 Clusters: STAGE-2 
 Processes 
Cluster1 [0, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Cluster2 [1, 2, 3] 
Table 9 Similarityof Process with Initial Clusters: STAGE-3 
 Cluster1 Cluster2 Class 
P0 0.7024 0.6094 0 
P1 0.6962 0.6484 0 
P2 0.7063 0.7074 1 
P3 0.6563 0.7051 1 
P4 0.7616 0.5510 0 
P5 0.8723 0.5690 0 
P6 0.8123 0.5586 0 
P7 0.8323 0.5659 0 
P8 0.8323 0.5659 0 
P9 0.7459 0.6083 0 
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Table 11 Clusters: STAGE-3 
 Processes 
Cluster1 [0, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Cluster2 [2, 3] 
Table 12 Final Clusters Formed 
 Processes 
Cluster1 [0, 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] 
Cluster2 [2, 3] 
Table 13 Nearest Neighbours, Cluster distances, neighbour distances w.r.t each process 
 
Similarity Value w.r.t, 
Clusters generated Cluster 
Allotment 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Similarity 
(Process, NN) 
 Cluster1 Cluster2 
P0 0.7799 0.5780 0 P9 0.9299 
P1 0.7140 0.6273 0 P5 0.75 
P2 0.6775 0.7500 1 P3 0.75 
P3 0.6275 0.7500 1 P2 0.6697 
P4 0.7244 0.5055 0 P9 0.7546 
P5 0.7898 0.5671 0 P7 0.8773 
P6 0.7325 0.5648 0 P5 0.8750 
P7 0.7562 0.5741 0 P5 0.8773 
P8 0.7562 0.5741 0 P5 0.8773 
P9 0.7353 0.5894 0 P0 0.9299 
 
Table 14 Nearest Neighbours for Processes in Cluster 1 
 Similarity 
 P0 P1 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 
P0 1.0000 0.6307 0.7195 0.6564 0.6546 0.6718 0.6718 0.9299 
P1 0.6307 1.0000 0.5767 0.6697 0.6131 0.6284 0.6284 0.6307 
P4 0.7195 0.5767 1.0000 0.6932 0.6909 0.7182 0.7182 0.7546 
P5 0.6564 0.6697 0.6932 1.0000 0.8750 0.8773 0.8773 0.6728 
P6 0.6546 0.6131 0.6909 0.8750 1.0000 0.8750 0.8750 0.6707 
P7 0.6718 0.6284 0.7182 0.8773 0.8750 1.0000 1.0000 0.6921 
P8 0.6718 0.6284 0.7182 0.8773 0.8750 1.0000 1.0000 0.6921 
P9 0.9299 0.6307 0.7546 0.6728 0.6707 0.6921 0.6921 1.0000 
Table 15 Nearest Neighbours for Processes in Cluster-2 
 Similarity Nearest 
Neighbor  P2 P3 
P2 1 0.75 P2 
P3 0.75 1 P3 
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Table.16 shows the normalized similarity value for each process which we call here as mapping value. This 
mapping value is obtained to obtain the dimensionality reduction. In simple words, we transform the process with 
dimensionality, 10 here to dimensionality of 1. In this way, we achieve dimensionality reduction of each process and 
finally map each process to a single value.  Table.19 shows the classification process of a new test process to verify 
if it is normal or abnormal. 
Table 16 Calculation of Total Similarity Value and Normalized Similarity Value 
 Similarity Valuew.r.t, 
Clusters generated Clusters 
Generated 
Nearest 
Neighbor 
Sim(NN) 
TotalSimilarity 
Value 
Normalized 
FinSim 
=TotalSim/3  Cluster1 Cluster2 
Total 
Similarity=sim/3 
P0 0.7799 0.5780 0 P9 0.9299 2.2878 0.7626 
P1 0.7140 0.6273 0 P5 0.75 2.0913 0.6971 
P2 0.6775 0.7500 1 P3 0.75 2.1775 0.7258 
P3 0.6275 0.7500 1 P2 0.6697 2.0472 0.6824 
P4 0.7244 0.5055 0 P9 0.7546 1.9845 0.6615 
P5 0.7898 0.5671 0 P7 0.8773 2.2342 0.7447 
P6 0.7325 0.5648 0 P5 0.8750 2.1723 0.7241 
P7 0.7562 0.5741 0 P5 0.8773 2.2076 0.7359 
P8 0.7562 0.5741 0 P5 0.8773 2.2076 0.7359 
P9 0.7353 0.5894 0 P0 0.9299 2.2546 0.7515 
Table 17 Processes after Dimensionality Reduction using proposed measure 
 Similarity Values Distance 
P0 0.7626 0.2374 
P1 0.6971 0.3029 
P2 0.7258 0.2742 
P3 0.6824 0.3176 
P4 0.6615 0.3385 
P5 0.7447 0.2553 
P6 0.7241 0.2759 
P7 0.7359 0.2641 
P8 0.7359 0.2641 
P9 0.7515 0.2485 
Table 18 New test process with Nearest Neighbour, Similarity and Distance Values 
 S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 NearestNN Sim Dist 
Ptest 0 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 Process-3 1.0 0 
Pnew 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Process-4 1.0 0 
Table 19 Classifying New Test Process for Intrusion 
 NearestNN SimDist 
Ptest Process-3 Normal 
Pnew Process-4 Abnormal 
5.  CONCLUSION 
Intrusion detection using text mining techniques has been recent research interest among researchers. The present 
approach of intrusion detection is based on applying clustering concept to perform dimensionality reduction. This 
dimensionally reduced process may then be used to perform classification and prediction. Through performing 
dimensionality reduction, we achieve space efficiency by reducing space complexity and also time efficiency by 
overcoming unnecessary computations which must be carried because of higher dimensions. In the present work, we 
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use k-means and adopt the proposed distance measure to achieve clustering of processes. The tighter bound on 
distance value and the flexibility of Gaussian framework as helps us to carry incremental clustering of new incoming 
system processes. The present work of intrusion detection concentrates on static clustering of processes and is 
discussed using a case study. In future, we aim to perform the incremental clustering of the process to achieve 
efficient intrusion detection.  
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